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Abstract
Conceiving of premises as collected into sets or multisets, instead of
sequences, may lead to triviality for classical and intuitionistic logic in
general proof theory, where we investigate identity of deductions. Any
two deductions with the same premises and the same conclusions be-
come equal. In terms of categorial proof theory, this is a consequence
of a simple fact concerning adjunction with a full and faithful functor
applied to the adjunction between the diagonal functor and the prod-
uct biendofunctor, which corresponds to the conjunction connective.
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1 Introduction
General proof theory addresses the question “What is a proof?”, or rather
“What is a deduction?”—a deduction being a hypothetical proof, i.e. a proof
with hypotheses—by dealing with questions related to normal forms for de-
ductions, and in particular with the question of identity criteria for deduc-
tions. It deals with the structure of deductions, as exhibited, for example,
with the help of the typed lambda calculus in the Curry-Howard correspon-
dence, and not with their strength measured by ordinals, which is what one
finds in proof theory that arose out of Hilbert’s programme.
Much of general proof theory is the field of categorial proof theory. Fun-
damental notions of category theory like the notion of adjoint functor, and
very important structures like cartesian closed categories, came to be of cen-
tral concern for logic in that field. Through results of categorial proof theory
called coherence results, which provide a model theory for equality of de-
ductions, logic finds new ties with geometry, topology and algebra (see the
books [1], [5] and [6], the more recent introductory survey [2], and references
therein).
In general proof theory, and in particular in categorial proof theory, one
looks for an algebra of deductions, and for that, one concentrates on the oper-
ations of this algebra, which come with the inference rules. As an equational
theory, the algebra of deductions involves the question of identity criteria for
deductions, the central question of general proof theory. (This question may
be found, at least implicitly, in Hilbert’s 24th problem; see [3].)
In categorial proof theory one usually studies a freely generated cate-
gory of a certain kind equationally presented. This freely generated category
is constructed out of syntactical material, as in universal algebra one con-
structs a freely generated algebra of a certain kind equationally presented by
factoring through an equivalence relation on terms. In categories we have
partial algebras—the arrow terms out of which the equivalence classes are
built have types, their sources and targets—but there is no significant math-
ematical difference in the construction when compared with what one has in
universal algebra (see [5], Chapter 2, in particular in Section 2.3). The ob-
jects of this freely constructed categories are propositions, i.e. formulae, and
the arrows, i.e. the equivalence classes of arrow terms, are deductions, i.e.
equivalence classes of particular derivations, whose sources are premises and
whose targets are conclusions. For deductions we have the partial operation
of composition and identity deductions (this is essential for them; see [4]).
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The categories in question are interesting if they are not preorders, i.e., not
all arrows with the same source and the same target are equal. Otherwise,
the proof theory is trivial: any deductions with the same premises and the
same conclusions become equal.
In terms of categorial proof theory, assuming that premises are collected
into sets leads to assuming that for every proposition A we have that A and
A ∧ A are isomorphic, where ∧ is the conjunction connective. Isomorphism
is understood here as in category theory: there are arrows, i.e. deductions,
from A to A∧A and back, which composed give identity arrows, i.e. identity
deductions (see [9] and references therein). We are led to assume moreover
that the associativity and commutativity of conjunction give isomorphisms.
It is not difficult to establish that a category K with binary product ×
is a preorder (i.e., any two arrows with the same source and the same target
are equal) iff for every object B of K the diagonal arrow from B to B × B
is an isomorphism. It is also not difficult to establish the related fact that
K is a preorder iff for every object B of K the first-projection arrow from
B×B to B is equal to the second-projection arrow with the same source and
the same target. We will put these facts within a more general categorial
context involving adjunction, which should shed light upon them. This is the
main goal of this paper, and achieving this goal, together with some related
matters (like those in the last section), is the novelty it should bring.
In categorial proof theory the binary connective of conjunction, both
classical and intuitionistic, is identified with binary product. So what we
mentioned above indicates that assuming that premises are collected into sets
leads to preordered categories where objects are propositions, i.e., formulae,
and arrows are deductions. This makes the proof theory trivial.
Assuming that premises are collected into multisets leads to assuming
that for every proposition A the permutation deduction from A∧A to A∧A,
which permutes the two occurrences of A in A ∧ A, is equal to the identity
deduction from A∧A to A∧A. Although that assumption leads to the same
absolute trivialization of the proof theory of classical and intuitionistic logic,
the trivialization obtained with it for linear logic is less absolute. The same
less absolute trivialization is obtained for the proof theory of relevant logic
by assuming moreover that A and A ∧ A are isomorphic. (What is this less
absolute trivialization will be explained in the last section, at the end of the
paper.)
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2 Sequents
Gentzen’s sequents are expressions of the form A1, . . . , An ⊢ B1, . . . , Bm
where A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bm are formulae of an object language, like a lan-
guage of propositional logic or a first-order language. Instead of the turnstile
⊢ Gentzen writes → (which is more commonly used nowadays for the binary
connective of implication; we use it below, as usual, for separating the sources
and targets of arrows in categories), for A and B he uses Gothic letters, and
for n and m Greek letters (see [10], Section I.2.3). The natural numbers n
and m may also be zero; when n is zero A1, . . . , An is the empty word, and
analogously for m and B1, . . . , Bm. For what we have to say in this paper we
could restrict ourselves to sequents where m is one.
The comma in sequents is an auxiliary symbol that serves to separate
formulae in sequences, which however is not essential. A sequent could as
well be A1 . . . An ⊢ B1 . . . Bm, but it could be difficult, though not impossible,
to see where Ai ends and Ai+1 begins in the sequence AiAi+1. Instead of
p, p, p ∧ q ⊢ r, r we would have the less perspicuous ppp ∧ q ⊢ rr, which
however is not ambiguous. (It becomes more perspicuous when we do not
omit the outermost parentheses of formulae, as in pp(p ∧ q) ⊢ rr.)
So Gentzen’s sequents may be conceived as expressions of the form Γ ⊢ ∆
where Γ and ∆ are finite, possibly empty, sequences of formulae. (Capital
Greek letters as schemata in sequents originate from Gentzen; see op. cit.)
To economize upon considerations involving structural rules, a number of au-
thors seem to think they are improving upon Gentzen if they take in Γ ⊢ ∆
that Γ and ∆ are not sequences of formulae, but other sorts of finite collec-
tions of formulae, multisets (i.e. sets of occurrences) of formulae or sets of
formulae. One should note immediately that with that Γ ⊢ ∆ seizes to be
a word of a formal language, as usually conceived. If Γ and ∆ are multisets
or sets, then Γ ⊢ ∆ is not a sequence of symbols. It could be conceived as a
triple (Γ,⊢,∆), in which case ⊢ is not essential. A sequent could be identified
with the ordered pair (Γ,∆).
Such a move is not without its dangers. We are not usually interested
in particular sequents, but in sequent schemata. In other words, we want
our sequents to be closed under substitution. If we continue using the no-
tation A1, . . . , An ⊢ B1, . . . , Bm as it is usually done, and if A1, . . . , An and
B1, . . . , Bm are conceived as sets of formulae, then by substituting p for q
from the sequent p, q ⊢ p we obtain as a substitution instance p ⊢ p, and the
application of the structural rule of thinning on the left is transformed into
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the figure on the right:
p ⊢ p
p, q ⊢ p
p ⊢ p
p ⊢ p
which does not look like an application of thinning.
This may be embarrassing, but need not be calamitous. It becomes really
dangerous when we are interested not only in provability, but in proofs, i.e.
not only in deducibility, but in deductions, and try to characterize identity of
deductions. If we do that in category theory, i.e. in categorial proof theory,
making the move that corresponds to switching from sequences to multisets
or sets is dangerous, and may result in collapse. It may trivialize matters:
any two deductions with the same premises and the same conclusions will be
equal. The corresponding categories will be preorders.
3 Sequents in categorial proof theory
In categorial proof theory sequents of the simple kind A ⊢ B, where A and
B are single formulae, give the types of arrows f : A → B, with A being
the source and B the target. In the presence of conjunction ∧, which serves
to replace the comma on the left-hand side of Gentzen’s sequents, and the
constant ⊤ which replaces the empty sequence, together with disjunction ∨
and the constant ⊥ for the right-hand side, we can mimic Gentzen’s sequents,
as Gentzen himself envisaged in [10] (Section I.2.4).
Conjunction, classical or intuitionistic (they are the same), corresponds
in this perspective to binary product, and ⊤ corresponds to a terminal ob-
ject (which may be conceived as nullary product). The associativity natural
isomorphism for binary product justifies Gentzen’s switch to sequences. The
matter with the commutativity, i.e. symmetry, natural isomorphism for bi-
nary product is more tricky. (We deal with it in the last section.) We may
identify A∧B and B∧A, but we should nevertheless distinguish the identity
deduction for A ∧ A to A ∧ A from the deduction that permutes the two
occurrences of A.
To the principle of contraction there does not however correspond an
isomorphism: A and A ∧ A are not isomorphic, as the sets A and A × A
are not isomorphic if A is finite with more than one member. To assume
that contraction is tied to an isomorphism leads to triviality. Matters are
analogous with binary coproduct and an initial object, which correspond
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respectively ∨ and ⊥, but we will concentrate on conjunction and product
in this paper.
By conjunction we understand here a binary connective to which a meet
operation of a semilattice corresponds algebraically. In the terminology of
substructural logics, this is an additive conjunction, for which we have the
two natural-deduction rules of conjunction elimination, the first-projection
and second-projection rules that correspond to Gentzen’s structural rule of
thinning. (We will consider on another occasion what happens if we assume
that contraction is an isomorphism for a multiplicative conjunction that does
not involve thinning, like a conjunction we find in relevant logic.)
4 Adjunction with a full and faithful functor
We will appeal to a result concerning adjoint functors dual to Theorem 1 of
Section IV.3 of [11]. (The proof of this result below will be more direct and
simpler than the proof in loc. cit.; it will not appeal to the Yoneda lemma.)
Let F be a functor from a category K to a category A, and G a functor
from A to K, such that G is right-adjoint to F , with members of the counit
of the adjunction being ϕA : FGA → A, for A an object of the category
A, and members of the unit of the adjunction being γB : B → GFB, for
B an object of the category K (we follow the notational conventions of [1],
Chapter 4, save that we write K instead of B, to distinguish this category
clearly from its object B). Then we have the following.
Proposition 4.1. The functor F is faithful iff for every object B of K the
arrow γB is monic.
Proof. From left to right we have:
γB ◦ g1 = γB ◦ g2 ⇒ FγB ◦Fg1 = FγB ◦Fg2, since F is a functor
⇒ ϕFB ◦FγB ◦Fg1 = ϕFB ◦FγB ◦Fg2
⇒ Fg1 = Fg2, by a triangular equation of adjunction
⇒ g1 = g2, since F is faithful.
From right to left we have:
Fg1 = Fg2 ⇒ GFg1 ◦ γC = GFg2 ◦ γC
⇒ γB ◦ g1 = γB ◦ g2, by the naturality of γ
⇒ g1 = g2, since γB is monic. q.e.d.
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For 1B : B → B being an identity arrow we have the following.
Proposition 4.2. The functor F is full iff for every object B of K there
is an arrow hB : GFB → B of K such that γB ◦ hB = 1GFB.
Proof. From left to right, the fullness of F implies that for every object B
of K there is an arrow hB : GFB → B such that FhB = ϕFB. We have:
γB ◦hB = GFhB ◦ γGFB, by the naturality of γ
= GϕFB ◦ γGFB, since FhB = ϕFB
= 1GFB, by a triangular equation of adjunction.
From right to left, take f : FB1 → FB2 and j = hB2 ◦Gf ◦ γB1 : B1 → B2.
We have:
Fj = FhB2 ◦FGf ◦FγB1, since F is a functor
= ϕFB2 ◦FγB2 ◦FhB2 ◦FGf ◦FγB1, by a triangular equation of
adjunction
= ϕFB2 ◦FGf ◦FγB1 , since γB2 ◦ hB2 = 1GFB2 and F is a functor
= f ◦ϕFB1 ◦FγB1, by the naturality of ϕ
= f , by a triangular equation of adjunction. q.e.d.
Corollary 4.3. The functor F is full and faithful iff for every object B
of K the arrow γB is an isomorphism.
Proof. From left to right, we have hB by the fullness of F and Proposition
4.2. Then we have:
F (hB ◦ γB) = FhB ◦FγB, since F is a functor
= ϕFB ◦FγB, since FhB = ϕFB
= F1B,
by a triangular equation of adjunction and the functoriality of F . By the
faithfulness of F we obtain that hB ◦ γB = 1B.
From right to left, we use Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 from right to left.
q.e.d.
As another corollary we have that if F is full and faithful, then the ad-
junction is trivial, in the sense that every two canonical arrows of adjunction
of the same type, i.e. with the same source and the same target, are equal
(for trivial adjunctions see [1], Sections 4.6.2 and 4.11).
7
5 Adjunction with the diagonal functor
Consider now the diagonal functor D from a category K to the product
category K×K. This functor is always faithful. We have on the other hand
the following.
Proposition 5.1. The functor D is full iff K is a preorder.
Proof. From left to right, take the arrows g, g′ : B1 → B2 of K. By the
fullness of D, for the arrow (g, g′) : (B1, B1)→ (B2, B2) of K×K we have an
arrow h of K such that (g, g′) = Dh = (h, h). Hence g = g′.
From right to left, we have for every arrow (g, g′) : (B1, B1) → (B2, B2)
of K ×K that g = g′. Hence (g, g′) = (g, g) = Dg. q.e.d.
The category K has a product biendofunctor × iff this functor is right
adjoint to the diagonal functor D. The members γB : B → B × B of the
unit of this adjunction, which can be called diagonal arrows, correspond to
the contraction arrows of conjunction wB : B ⊢ B ∧ B. If these arrows
are isomorphisms, then, by Proposition 4.2 (and Corollary 4.3 from right
to left), the diagonal functor D is full, and, by Proposition 5.1 from left to
right, K is a preorder. In proof-theoretical terms, any two deductions with
the same premises and the same conclusions are equal. So if we want our
proof theory to be nontrivial, we should not permit the contraction arrows
wB to be isomorphisms.
Conversely, if K is a preorder, by Proposition 5.1 from right to left, the
diagonal functor is full, and, by Corollary 4.3 from left to right, the arrows
γB : B → B × B are isomorphisms. So we have established the following for
categories K with binary product ×.
Proposition 5.2. The category K is a preorder iff for every object B of
K the diagonal arrow γB : B → B × B is an isomorphism.
Note that it is possible in a category K with binary product × to have for
every object B that B and B ×B are isomorphic without the diagonal map
being an isomorphism. We will consider that matter in the next section.
We have established Proposition 5.2 without mentioning explicitly the
projection arrows, but they are in the background. It is easy to see that K is
a preorder iff for every object B of K we have that the first-projection arrow
k1B,B : B×B → B is equal to the second-projection arrow k
2
B,B : B×B → B.
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From left to right this is trivial, while for the other direction we have that
if k1B,B = k
2
B,B, then for any two arrows g, g
′ : C → B of K we have for
〈g, g′〉 : C → B ×B that k1B,B ◦ 〈g, g
′〉 = k2B,B ◦ 〈g, g
′〉, and hence g = g′.
If the diagonal functor D is full, then for the members (k1B,B, k
2
B,B) :
(B × B,B ×B)→ (B,B) of the counit of the adjunction of D with the bi-
endofunctor × we have that k1B,B = k
2
B,B. So if the projection arrows k
1
B,B
and k2B,B are not equal, then D is not full, and, by Proposition 5.1, the
category K is not a preorder. That K is not a preorder follows of course
immediately from the inequality of k1B,B and k
2
B,B, but it is worth seeing how
Proposition 5.1 and with it the wider perspective of the preceding section
are involved.
This shows how the non-triviality of K hinges on distinguishing the two
projection arrows from B × B to B, i.e. the two deductions from B ∧ B to
B based on the two natural-deduction rules of conjunction elimination (see
the end of Section 3).
In a category with binary product we derive k1B,B = k
2
B,B from the as-
sumption that the diagonal arrow wB : B → B × B, called γB above, is an
isomorphism in the following manner. We have in any such category that
k1B,B ◦wB = k
2
B,B
◦wB = 1B, and then, by the isomorphism of wB, we obtain
k1B,B = k
2
B,B.
When k1B,B = k
2
B,B, then k
1
B,B, i.e. k
2
B,B, is the arrow inverse to wB :
B → B × B, which makes of the diagonal arrow wB an isomorphism. We
have k1B,B ◦wB = 1B anyway. We also have:
wB ◦ k
1
B,B = 〈k
1
B,B, k
1
B,B〉, by the naturality of wB
= 〈k1B,B, k
2
B,B〉, since k
1
B,B = k
2
B,B
= 1B×B.
The reduction to triviality brought by assuming that the diagonal arrows
wB are isomorphisms could have been shown by appealing only to these
comments about k1B,B = k
2
B,B. We preferred however to put the matter in
a wider perspective given by the preceding section. This shows that the
matters we deal with are not peculiar to the adjunction with the diagonal
functor.
The triviality of the adjunctions involving the quantifiers that are consid-
ered in [8] (Section 1.4) has the same roots involving sets. The universally
quantified formula ∀xA interpreted over a domain with two objects a and
b stands either for the conjunction Axa ∧ A
x
b or the conjunction A
x
b ∧ A
x
a.
Moreover, Axa ∧ A
x
a and A
x
a are not distinguished. Quantifiers involve sets of
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objects, and neither multisets nor sequences. So from the point of view of
general proof theory the assertion that quantifiers are like conjunctions and
disjunctions should be taken with a grain of salt.
6 Collapse with sets and multisets of premises
We have noted after Proposition 5.2 that it is possible in a category with
binary product × to have for every object B that B and B×B are isomorphic
without the diagonal arrow wB : B → B × B being an isomorphism. The
isomorphism may be produced by something else. To see that, take the
category C with binary product freely generated out of a nonempty set P of
generating objects, which are usually taken to be syntactical objects, letters,
like propositional variables. (The construction of such equationally presented
syntactical freely generated categories is described in detail in [5], Chapter 2,
in particular in Section 2.3.) Out of C we can build another category with
binary product, which we call C′, by replacing the objects of C, which are
like propositional conjunctive formulae, by sets of letters, free generators,
occurring in these formulae. If P is the singleton {p}, then we have in C′ a
single object {p} (i.e. P itself). The category C′ is not a preorder if we keep
in it the structure of arrows of C. (That this is possible is shown by the one-
object category that is a skeleton of the category of denumerably infinite sets
with functions as arrows.1) So the diagonal arrow w{p} : {p} → {p}, though
its source and target are both {p}, need not be equal to the identity arrow
1{p} : {p} → {p}. Analogously, the projection arrows k
1
{p},{p} : {p} → {p} and
k2{p},{p} : {p} → {p} need not be equal to 1{p}, and they need not be mutually
equal.
Once we have passed to C′ and understand this category proof-theoretical-
ly, the temptation is however big to take the diagonal arrow w{p}, which
corresponds to contraction, to be the identity arrow 1{p}. In proof theory
the switch to sets of premises is usually made in order not to be obliged
to keep an account of structural rules. If we have to continue keeping this
account, what is the advantage of the switch? We are moreover required to
keep an account of contraction when it is invisible, when it consists in passing
from {p} to {p}.
When w{p} is identified with 1{p} we have collapse, as we have seen in
1I am grateful to Zoran Petric´ for suggesting this example.
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this paper (and in particular in Proposition 5.2). Collapse also ensues when
k1{p},{p} = k
2
{p},{p} = 1{p} : {p} → {p}, which seems tempting and natural
to assume when the structural rule of thinning is invisible, when it adds a
premise we already have, and premises are collected into sets (see the trivial
thinning figure mentioned in Section 2).
Suppose now C is a freely generated category with a symmetric monoidal
multiplication biendofunctor ⊗ (see [11], Section VII.7; these categories are
called symmetric associative in [5], Chapter 5), which corresponds to the
multiplicative conjunction of linear logic, and is tied to collecting premises
into multisets. In C we have a symmetry natural isomorphism cB1,B2 :
B1 ⊗ B2 → B2 ⊗ B1. Now C
′ is obtained from C by replacing the objects
of C, i.e. propositional formulae, by sets of occurrences of letters in these
formulae, i.e. multisets of letters occurring in these formulae. As before, C′ is
not a preorder if we keep in it the structure of arrows of C, and in particular
continue distinguishing the symmetry isomorphisms cp,p : p⊗ p→ p⊗ p from
the identity arrows 1p⊗p : p⊗ p→ p⊗ p. The corresponding arrows in C
′ go
from the multiset {p, p} to the multiset {p, p}.
The assumption cB,B = 1B⊗B is however dangerous. If ⊗ happens to be
binary product ×, this assumption leads to collapse, as did the isomorphism
of the diagonal arrows and the equality of the projection arrows. This is
because we have k1B,B ◦ cB,B = k
2
B,B in categories with binary product, where
cB,B is defined as 〈k
2
B,B, k
1
B,B〉. So collecting premises into multisets in clas-
sical and intuitionistic logic is as dangerous as collecting them into sets.
The situation is somewhat different in linear logic. We have the assump-
tion cB,B = 1B⊗B in a category called S
′ in [5] (Section 6.5; this category
is obtained out of the symmetric associative category freely generated by
a nonempty set of generating objects), which is a preorder, and this shows
that the assumption cB,B = 1B⊗B makes that all the canonical arrows tied
to multiplicative conjunction in linear logic that have the same source and
the same target are equal. This does not mean however that the assumption
will lead in general to preorder.
If among the free generators we do not have only objects, but also different
arrows with the same source and the same target, they will not become
equal because of cB,B = 1B⊗B . This is shown by an inductive argument
establishing that for every equation derivable for such a freely generated
category, for every generating arrow f , we cannot have f on one side of the
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equation without having it on the other.2 The same holds for relevant logic
and categories related to it (see [12] and [7]).
In these categories we have, as members of a natural transformation cor-
responding to contraction, diagonal arrows from B to B ⊗ B, with ⊗ corre-
sponding to multiplicative conjunction as above. In addition to cB,B = 1B⊗B ,
we are led to assume that these diagonal arrows are isomorphisms if we as-
sume that premises are collected into sets, and we will show in another place
how this makes equal all the canonical arrows tied to multiplicative conjunc-
tion that have the same source and the same target. This assumption of
isomorphism will however not lead in general to preorder, for reasons anal-
ogous to those in the preceding paragraph. So, in linear and relevant logic,
with premises collected into multisets or sets the danger is still there, but
not as big as in classical and intuitionistic logic.
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